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In  this paper a  dynamic model is constructed  in  which labor and capital taxes are
determined-  endogenously  through  majority  voting. The  wealth  distribution  of the economy
is shown  to influence  the voting  behavior,  and  hence  the equilibrium levels  of the tax  rates,
which in turn affect  the future distribution  of wealth. It is shown  that the economy  exhibits
a unique dynamic behavior.  Because  of the endogenously  determined  taxes,  the asset
prices,  w0dith distribution,  and the tax rates  can display  persistent  fluctuations,.  and even
iimit cycles,  in reaction  to exogenous  disturbances,  or even  due to initial conditions. It is
also shown that "tax smoothing"  does  not necessarily  appear  to naturally arise in such a
model, as the economy  can display  extreme  fluctuations  in tle  endogenously  determined
tax rates.I.  INTRODUCTION
In this paper a dynamic  model is constmcted  in which agents  vote each period on the
desired  capital  and  labor taxes  that are to be implemented  in order to finance  a.given  level
of govemment consumprion. Based  on their different wealth levels, agents  will  have
distinctive  preferences  concerning  these  tax rates. Given that a majority voting scheme  is
assumed  to be in place,  a  very interesting  dynamic  behavior  arises  in cross  sectional  wealth
levels,  as well as in the time-series  paths  of asset  prices  and tax rates. It is shown that
temporary exogenous  disturbances  can have not  only persistent effects, but  also a
permanent  impact on a variety  of endogenous  variables. Exogenous  disturbances,  as  well
as initial  conditions are shown to produce limit cycles  in the wealth distribution, asset
prices, as well  as in  the endogenously  determined tax rates.  This  is an important
...  -breaklhrough  because  there  is a paucity  of models,  with endogenous  poliry formulation, in
which policies  implemented  in one period influence  the economy  in such  a manner as  to
alter the future course of policy formulation as well'
There has  been  a tremendous  literature  written on both the norrnative  and  positive  aspects
of taxation. The normative  aspects  usually  relate to how tax policy can be formulated so
as  to maximize  some  sort of welfare  criterion,  such  as  minimizing  the tax  burden  on agents,
orpossiblymaximizinggrowth.Forexample,onemightaskthequestionastowhatare
the appropriate  distortional  tax  rates  that should  be implemented  in order to retire a given
amount of government  debt. or,  alternatively  one might ask  whether a capital-gains  tax
would have a deleterious  effect  on the growth rate ofthe economy. The positive  analyses
of  the  literature usually examine the impact of  actual taxes on welfare, ot  various
endogenous  variables. A case  in point would be whether the actual levels  of capital and
labor taxation exacerbate,  rather then ameliorate,  the cyclical  fluctuations  of aggregates
over  the course  of the business  cycle.l
until  very recently,  however,  what had been missing  from most of these  analyses  of tax
policy is a theory of how taxes  are actually determined.  Presurnably  in most market
economies  the policy-makers  make decisions  based on what they perceive to  be thecollective  desires  of a diverse  group of agents  in the economy. Government  policies  may
then influence the distribution of wealth across  the economy.  This distribution then
influences  the manner  in which  future  policy  variables  are  determined,  which in turn affects
the  levels of  future  policy variables tlrough  the  policy-making mechanism.  such
mechanisms  are  usually  absent  from traditional  analyses  of the affect  of government  policy.
It  is thesis of this paper that it  is important to understand  how the wealth dynamics
produced  by an economy  help to influence  the rules  determining  public policy  parametefs,
rather than vice versa. Furthermore,  this inquiry is also  conducted  within the context  of
a dynamic general equilibrium framework. This is important because  there have been
comparatively  few papers  that have  incorporated  endogenous  optimal  voting decisions  into
dynamic equilibrium models  with utility-maximizing  agents,  presumably  because  of the
..complicated  nature of the problem.
There has  been a great  deal of work done  recently  in which some  government  policies  are
determined  endogenous\. Tabellini (L991)  studies  the behavior  of governrnent  debt in an
ecoromy in which policies  are determined  by majority rule. Tabellini and Alesina (1990)
study  an economy  in which agents  vote  on the composition  of government  spending.  They
then characterize  the factors  that influence  the size  of the budget deficit.  Tabellini and
persson  (1990)  provide a comprehensive  guide to how credibility and political issues  can
influence  the determination  of macroeconomic  policy. Alesina (1988)  and Perotti (1992)
provide  a detailed  set  of references  to this growing  theoretical  as  well as  applied  literature.
what  is missing  from much of the existing  litelature, and what is the main point of the
present  paper,  is an explanation  of how policies  implemented  in one period influence the
distribution of wealth in such  a manner  as  to also  influence  the policies  that are chosen  in
future periods.2
There is a further empirical  motivation  for utilizing the approach  to the determination  of
policy parameters  studied in this paper.  One might be very  hard-pressed  to derive an
argument for  the  optimality of  the current observed  govefnment tax and  spending
structures  based  on the solution  to some  optimal welfare  problem,  so the reason  for suchapolicystructulemaywellliewiththepoliticalnatureinwhichpolicyPafametersare
formulated. one might suggest  that it is no coincidence  that in the u.S. there has  recently
been a growing  interest  in cutting capital  taxation,  not to mention run higher government
budget  deficits,  and spending  more money  on social  programs  for the elderly' at the same
time that there is a growing  population  of elderly  citizens. obviously, these  people have
a strong incentive to participate  in the political process  in such a way as to encourage
policy-makers  to divert more resources  in their own direction, and possibly  also cut tax
rates on their main sources  of income. For the elderly,  this is more likely to be capital
income.  Although this particular issue  is not addressed  in this paper, this observation
serves  as  a motivation for studying  or modelling  how the economic  agents  can  influence  the
policy-making  mechanism'
The remainder  of this paper  is organized  as  follows. In the next section  the physical  and
political structure,  as  well as  the nature  of the equilibrium of thjs very simple economy  is
described  in detail. The economy  is populated  by a sequence  of overlapping  generations,
each  of which lives  for three  period  only. Agents  work in their first two periods  of life, and
hold capital into the last two periods  of life.  Each  period the govefnment  must finance  a
fixed level of real consumption for itself.  Each period agents  vote on the apPropriate levels
of capital and labor taxation,  while playing  a Nash  game  against  futule generations. It is
assumed  that the maioiity of the voters determine the levels of these parameters. In
section III  a series  of examples  are presented. It  is shown how temporary exogenous
disturbances  can have persistent  and permanent  effects  on the equilibrium, and on the
endogenous  policy variables.  It  is shown that  there can exist multiple  steady-state
equilibria,  which depend  on the initial conditions  of the economy.  The implications  for the
wealth distribution, and asset  prices  are studied' Also, it is shown  that the tax rates  can
appear  to fluctuate  dramatically  in the model,  with the agents  voting to use  the labor tax,
or the capital  tax,  but apparently  never  both simultaneously.  This provides  some  motivation
for why one might expect  to observe  the antithesis  of the usual tax smoothing  behavior.
Section  IV contains  some  final remarks.II.  THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT AND THE DQUILIBRIUM
The economy  is one in which time is discrete  and is indexed  by t =  I,2,...  Each period
there is a generation  of agents  of size  N who enter  the economy,  and are present  there for
three periods. An agent  who enters  the economy  in period t will be said  to be a member
of generation  t, and is present  in the economy  in periods  t, t+1, and t*2'  Agents have
perfect  foresight  concerning  the future.3 Each  member  of generation  t wishes  to consume
some  of the single  consumption  good  in period t+1,  and  t+2.  That is to say,  they do not
consume  in the first period of life.  Such  agents  have  one unit of labor effort to supply
inelastically  in period t and in t-| L, and which will produce  w,., and wr,,*, units of the
consumption  good in periods  t and t+l  respectively.a  These  wages  are measuled  in units
of the consumption  good.
There is pfoductive capital in the economy  which produces  a dividend in units of the
consumption  good each  period. As a benchmark,  it is assumed  that the capital stock  does
not depreciate,  and cannot  be augmented. Agents  who are members  of genelation t will
wish  to consume  in future periods,  and  can  do so  by purchasing  productive  capital  in period
t at a price P,, For each  unit of capital  held by the agent,  they then receive  a dividend  of
d, units of the consumption  good  in period t+1, and can  then sell some  of their capital  or
buy more capital in period t*1  at a price Pr+r.
A member of generation  t has  a utility function that will be described  as follows
ln(c.,_,)  + B  ln(cr.,,r),
where  q,, represents  consumption  by an agent  in period  t who is currently  in period s  of his
life (s = 2,3),  alrd  B > 0 is the discount  factor. In period t each  member of generation
t-1 supplies  their labor inelastically. The agent  has  his labor income  taxed at a tate rr,.
The agent  will then buy capital with the remaining  income,  so that the period t budget
constraint  for such an agent  is thenP,x2.,.,  = w,.,(t-zi).  (1)
Here 4,,*, represents  the number  of units of capital  purchased  in period  t by an agent'  who
is currently in period (s-1)  of his life, and which is then taken  into period t+1.
A member of generation  t who entels  period t+1 with xr,r, units of capital then collects
a dividend, in units of the consumption  good,  in the amount of d,', per unit of capital'
Furthermore capital can then be purchased  or sold at a price of P,*r. However,  the total
return to holding capital - dividend  and price of capitat  - is taxed  at a tate of l  *r.5 The
agent also  supplies  his unit of labor, and collects  wage  income  of wxt+r  and pays  taxes  on
this income.  The agent  will then wish to take some  capitat into the final period of his
lifetimg. and the amount  of this capital  will be denoted  by  x3,t+2.  The budget  constraint  for
such  an agent  in the second  period of his planning  horizon is then written as  follows
cr,,*,  = (P,,, + d,u)Q,-r!u)xr,u,  * wr,nr(1-rt,,r)  - Purx.,,.z.  Q)
In the final period of this agent's  life he brings  x.,,*,  units of capital into the period.  The
agent  then collects  the dividend  (d,*r) on the capital,  and  sells  his stock  of capital  at a price
P,.r. The agent  then pays  the capital  tax at a rate rr,',  on the total return to capital' and
consumes  the remaining  proceeds.  The budget  constraint  for the agent  in this period can
then  be written  as
cr.,,"  = (P,.2  * d,-r)(1'-{,)xr,,.".  (3)
It will be assumed  that the amount'of  capital  is in fixed supply' This amount  is normalized
to be equal  unity, and it will then also  be assumed  that N=1.  Then the market clearing
condition for the capital market in every  period t will then be written as
rz,r.r * xt,r.r = 1' (4)
Each period there is a certain amount of real government  consumption  gt that must be
financed  through taxing  labor and/or  capital  income. This government  expenditure  either
provides  no utility  to agents.To preserve  the simplicity  of the environment,  it will also  be assumed  that the exogenous
sequence  {d,, g,,  wr,,,  wa,}i=, is strictly  positive  and is known with certainty  V t'
Parenthetically,  it should  be noted  that at date  t= 1,  there exist  the members  of generation
0, and -1. At the beginning  of this period these  agents  hold the aggregate  capital stock  of
one unit (i.e. xo.,  + x-r,r  = 1). In period 1 the members  of generation  (-1) supply  all their
capital to maximize their period I  consumption. In this same  period the members  of
generation  0 face  budget  constraints  (2), and  constraint  (3) in the following  period. These
agents  then maximize  their utility firnction subject  to these  constraints.
Now, the tax rates  that appear  iD the budget  constraints  are yet to be detemined.  The
mechanism  that sets  these  parameters  is now  described.  It is assumed  that at the beginning
of every  period t, the members  of generation  t-2, t-1, and  t vote  on the size  of the tax rates
1f.  rt  r),  which are restricted  to be non-negative.  After the tax fates  are then determined,
the agents  maximize  utility subject  to their budget  constraints  while acting  as  price takefs,
and taking as given the behavior of  other agents,  including the behavior of  future
generations.
It should be apparent  now that in any period the members  of the young generation  will
always  prefer a capital income  tax  to a labor income  tax,  since  their sole  source  of income
is labor income.  It is also apparent  that the members  of the old generation  will always
prefef the labor income  tax since  their sole  soutce  of income  derives  from capital. Hence'
the decision  as  to what the tax rates  will actually  be is determined  solely  by the members
of middle-aged  generation.
obviously the middle-aged  agents must balance costs of both  types of  taxation.  In
particular, they dislike capital income  taxation  because  tbey hold some  capital. But they
also  dislike labor taxation  for two reasons.  First, a labor tax is also  a tax on their second
period labor income,  and so hurts them directly. Secondly,  this latter tax lowers  the labor
income  of the young  and  middle-aged  agents,  and  thereby  lowers  the equilibrium price ofcapital,  and hence  lowers  the return to holding  capital.
Along with these  latter consequences  are other indirect effects. As will be made obvious
below,  both these  taxes  have  tle impact  of lowering  the price of capital  from what it would
otherwise  be if there  wefe no taxes.  This may  be a fortunate  effect  from the point of view
of a middle-aged  agent  since  this may  allow them to purchase  more capital  at the reduced
price and  thereby  raise  their consumption  in the last  period  of their life. Yet another  affect
is that a change  in the tax rates  while an agent  is middle aged  will influence  the amount
of capital taken by his generation  into the last period of life.  This has the potentially
unfavorable affect of lowering the rate of return to capital, since these agents  will be
supplying  their capital inelastically,  which helps  lower the rate of return'
There is one last effect that the middle-aged  agents  must also take into consideration.
Each  period t the government  must  finance  a level  of expenditures  g,,  and the government
revenue  from capital  and  labor sources  must  be sufficient  to finance  this expenditure  level-
The middle-aged  agents  nust  also take this into consideration  when formulating their
voting strategy. This means  that the consideration  of a marginally  lower capital tax rate
must then necessarily  imply a marginally  higher  labor tax. Agents  are assumed  to take all
of these  effects  into consideration  when formulating  their voting strategJi'
To illuminate this discussion,  it  may help to proceed  with the solution of the agents'
optimization  problem. In particular  note first that in period  t the agents  who ate nembers
of generation  t have a trivial sort of behavior,  described  by equation  (1)' in that they buy
as  much capital as  their labor income  will permit. Members  of generation  t-2 consume  all
their after tax capital earnings,  and so their decision  bears no more discussion. The
interesting problem is then posed  by analyzing  the decision  problem of a member of
generation  t-L.  Now consider  this optimization  problem  from the agents  point of view of
such  an agent  after the tax  lates  in period  t have  been  set. Then such  an agent  maximizes
the following objective  function
'7ln(cr,,  ) + B  ln(cr.,-r),
subject  to the constraints
cr,,  = (P, + d,)(L-f)xr,,  + wr,,(L-rt,) - P,xr,,
cr,,*r  = (P,*r  + d,.r)(I-f*,)xr',,
It is easily  seen  ttrat the solution  to this problem is of the following form




P,  +  d,)(r  - ro,)r,.,  * w,.,1t-r')1.
Now by substituting  equations  (1) and  (6) into (4), the equilibrium  price of capital  can  then
be derived as follows
There are several  important features  of this pricing equation  to note. First, note that the
distriburion  of capital across  the population influences  the price of capital.  The more
capital that is held by the middle-aged  generation  (xa,),  as opposed  to agents  who are in
the last  period  of their tife,  the higher  the  price  of capital.  This  should  make  sense  since
the agents  who are in the third period of life will be supplying  all their capital inelastically,
and the more capital they havg, the lower will  be the equilibrium price of  capital.
consequently,  the more capital  held  by members  of the middle-aged  generation,  the higher
will be the price of capital. Secondly,  note that the higher the labor income  tax the lower
will be the price of capital  since  the members  of generation  t cannot  afford to purchase  as




(8)as  well.  It is also  the case  that the impact  that changes  in r,f or nr have  on P,  will depend
on the levels  of w1.,,  wa,,  d,, and x.r.
The government  is restricted  to balancing  its budget  each  period so  that it must  implement
labor and capital tax rates each period to finance its expenditures. Hence its budget
constraint  is written as follows
g,  =  r:(wr.,  * .r,) * f,1r, * d,1.  (9)
Now a substitution  of the optimal decision  rules,  (3)  and (7), for a member  of generation
t-l  back into their utility function (5) produces  the following  version  of an indirect utility
function
''[[rhJl,a  +  d,)(t  -  1)*,,,  *  (L
This is the indirect utility function that the agents,  who are middle-aged  in period t, seek
to maximize. However,  these  agents  also  realize  that their choice  of taxes  will influence  the
price of capital in the present  period (P,),  the future price of capital (P,*,), as  well as  their
future asset  holdings  (xr.,*,). Since  xr,'*,  is determined  from equations  (4) and (6)' and P,
and P,*, are determined  by versions  of equation (8), by making these  substitutions  into
equation  (10),  and  then after  conducting  a  mammoth  amount  of algebra,  this  indirect utility
function can then be rewritten as  follows.
v,Ui,1)  =  1r  *  p)h[xa,g-zf)[w,,,(1-,','1  *  a1*  w,,,1r-r)]]  - tIt -",,(t-":)[#J]
-f  n[1r-rj;1w,,,(r+B)+9w,.,f*x,,,1r-,!)Bd,-9r  -1,) l-4)w,.,Ir  - ',,,{r-'f  ,t#]]l  (11)
* 0(wr,,, wz,,,  dr, wt,r,t,  wz,r,t,  d,u, tt,u,  ,i.r, B)'
This is the indirect utility  function faced by an agent, who is a member of generation t-1,
at the beginning of period t, and it reflects the optimal savings  behavior for such an agent'
- ,:>r,,))* Btn[(r,.,  +  d,.r)(t  - 
"f.,)',,,.,]. 
(10)given any specified  level for the tax parameters  (zt,  rf,).  Here the thild  line of this
expression  is a nonJinear combination  of the specified  variables  which are beyond the
control of the agents  who  are memben of generation  t-1. The point of this is, however,
that this latter term is independent  of tlre choice of tax rates (tr  rt,) which are to be
chosen  at date  t by members  of generation  h1. The fiIst two lines  of this expression  shows
a function of variables  that are exogenous  at the beginning  of period t, oI are to be chosen
at the beginning  of period t by the voters. The members  of generation  t-1'  then choose  (or
vote for) the tax rates that will maximize  their indirect utility function V, subject  to the
government  budget  constraint  (9).
It is assumed  that at the beginning  of each  period  the agents,  in choosing  the tax rates,  ale
,..thenplaying.a  Nash  game  against  future generations.  That is,  tle middle-aged  agents  take
future tax rates  as given  when choosing  their optimal tax rates. However,  they take into
account  how these  tax rates  will influence  the pfesent  and  futule prices  of capital,  and  asset
holdings.6  ?
Finally, to make this discussion  precise,  it is worthwhile to proceed  with the following
formal definition of the equilibrium under study'
Definition:  A  Nash Pefect  Foresigltt competitive Equilibium  for  this  economy ls  a
collection of non-negative  sequences  {do g, Pn  wr.r,  wz,p  Xr,u  Xap  c1,p  Q4r,  rk, te  t }i=,'  such
that for t>1, the following conditions  are satisfied.
i)  For members  of generation  t-1, given  the levels  of (d,,  g,,  wr,, wet,  xzo  ],rr)'
the period t taxes  (rko  zr,)  are  chosen  to maximize  t}re  value  function Vr(l'rtr),  as  given  by
equation (11), subject  to the government's  budget  constraint  (9)'
ii)  Given  tax  rates (tku zt,), and the  price of  capital P,, the  quantities
(xr,,,  xzn  cr,,,  c',) maximize  the utility function (5), subject  to the budget  constraints' This
implies the decision  rules (3), (6), and (7) are satisfied.
iiD  The government  budget  constraint  (9) holds  for each  period'
10'9
v)
Equation (4) holds,  so that there is equilibrium in the capital market'
Given d,, g, , xz,u  rkn and z',, tlle price of capital  P' is given  by equation  (8)'
It should also  be noted that an exogenous  constraint  that is being imposed  is that the tax
rates  (1,, /,)  are restricted  to being non-negative'
Now equation (11) is a formidable  and intimidating expression.  Rather than attempting
to gain insights  directly  from this equation,  it will be more enlightening  to look at a sedes
of examples  to get a feel for how the appearance  of the equilibria of the economy.
III.  SOME SAMPLE ECONOMIES
. .Much  of ,the  work in the optimal  taxation  literature  has  the implication that the "optimal"
level of distortional taxation is that which minimizes the social deadweight  loss.  This
usually  gives  rise to optimal tax rates  in which all commodities  are taxed  to some  degree
so that the  marginal  social  costs  from all forms  of taxation  are equated. This would be the
case  if one followed the Ramsey  tax rules. This might be referred  to as a tax-smoothing
argument.s  It is then of interest  to see  if, in the context  of the above-specified  framework
with agents  voting on the optimal Ievels  of taxation,  the resulting  tax levels  would display
such  properties,  in the sense  that agents  will choose  to have  positive  taxation  on both labor
and  capital.
As it happens,  and as  will be shown,  for all the examples  that will be presented  below' this
result does not obtain.  In particular, middle-aged  agents  always  prefer to have capital
taxation  or labor taxation,  but  not both. Another way  of putting this is to say  that the value
function displayed  in equation (11), rather than being concave  in the tax rates (1,  /,),
turns out tobe convex  in these  tax rates. The teason  for this will be explained  in the first
example. This is an iltuminating result  in that it shows  a potential avenue  through which
there might be divergence  between  the actual  observed  taxation  rates,  and those  derived
from the solution from some  optimal planning  problem'
11Examole  #1:  This example  illustrates  the potential  instability  that exists  in the model' In
particular, there exists  two equilibria which depend upon the initial  conditions of the
economy.onedisplayslimitcyclesoftwoperiodsinlength,whiletheotherdoesnot.
The  parameter  values  are  chosen  as  follows:  wr,,=11,wr,=7,  d,=g,:5,andB:3'  Vt'  Two
different  initial conditions  are  chosen  for capital  holdings  of the initial middle-aged  agents'
oneisx,'=.3g,whiletheotheris\F.40.Thereisnootherexogenousuncertaintyor
changes  in the economy. Figure 1 illustrates  the resulting  paths  for the price of capital  in
each  case. The solid line shows  the behavior  for the price of capital  when x2,,=.40  while
the dashed  line is the price of capital  when x'':'39'  obviously' the solid line converges
relatively quickly to a constant  steady  state  while the dashed  line displays  cycles' Figure
.,2shows,theresultingpathsforthecapitalholdingsbythemiddle.agedagentsforthesame
examp|e.Againthecyclesappearintlrisvariableaswel|asforthecasewherex",='39.
Figure  3 illustrates  the behavior  of the tax  lates  that are  observed  in the cyclic  equilibrium'
while Figure 4 shows  the path of tax  rates  in the other non-cyclic  equilibrium. In this non-
cyclic  equilibrium the agents  choose  to use  only the labor tax. In Figure 3 the solid line
is the path for the capital  income  tax,  while the dashed  line is the path for the labor income
tax.
what  is happening  in this example  is that when x41=.39,  the initial middle-aged  agents
begin  with relatively  little capital,  and consequently  vote to tax capital heavily  in the first
period of the economy,  while choosing  to not tax labor at all.  consequently,  they have
comparatively  little capital  in period  2 because  they  began  with little in the previous  period'
and also  because  the young  agents  in the previous  period did not have  their labor income
taxed, and could then afford to  purchase  plenty of  capital'  In  period 2'  the  new
middle-aged  then have  plenty  of capital,  relative  to the initial middle-aged  in the previous
period, and they do the reverse:  they vote to tax only labor and not capital at all'  This
pattern of behavior  then repeats  itself every  two periods. There is no convergence  of any
ofthe decision  variables,  nor for the price of capital,  or the distribution  of capital. For thecase  where x.r=.40, the initial middle-aged  agents  do not own quite enough  capital for it
to be advantageous  for them to vote for a capital income  tax,  Figure 4 shows  that as a
result the capital income tax is never chosen,  and so the economy  only implements  the
labor tax.
As noted above,  it is also  of interest  to see  if the agents  in this economy  voluntarily choose
to implement  some  variant of what may  be called  a tax-smoothing  policy. As both Figures
3 and 4 show  in the cyclic  equilibrium, the solutions  observed  for the tax rates  tend to be
of the "bang-bang"  variety,  with the middle-aged  agents  choosin  g either  labor or capital
income  tax.  but not both. The reason  for this is best  seen  in Figure 5. This illustrates  the
shape  of the value  function,  as  a function  of how  much  of the government  revenue  is raised
.from the"labor tax.e As can be seen,  the agent  is likely to choose  to tax eithel labor or
pcapital, and in  this particular diagram it  is the latter.  As Figure 5 illustrates, the
constraint  that the capital and labor taxes  be non-negative  is indeed binding.  were this
constraint  not imposed,  agents  might then vote to expropriate  labor or capital income in
order to subsidize  the other factor.
To obtain an understanding  for why this result  obtains,  first of all note that from a voter's
point of view, there is not a linear relationship  between  the two tax rates. This is seen  by
noting that although  equation  (9) shows  there  is a linear  trade-off  between  taxing  labor and
capital income,  capital income  is endogenous,  as  equation  (8) demonstrates'  To see  why
the value  function may  be convex  in the tax  rates,  note that the beginning  of period  wealth
of a middle-aged  agent  in period t can  be written as  follows
(P, + d,)(l - n!)xt, + (l  - rt,)wr,.
By using equation (8) to substitute  for the price of capital,  this can then be re-written as
l3(12)
Now obviously  this is a highly  nonlinear  expression  in the tax  rates. one could  additionally
substitute  the government's  budget  constraint  (9) into t}is expression  to get rid of one of
the tax rates'  The result would be an expression  that is even more nonlinear  in the
remaining  tax  rate.lo
The agent's  consumption  in the final period can then be written as follows
(P,u * d,u)*r,,',(l - 
"i-t) 
= [",,^,(1 
- 'i,)].  (13)
Now experimentation  with equations  (12)  and  (13)  reveals  that there  are  two forces  making
welfare decreasing  in the amount  of the labol tax,  and two forces  making it decreasing  in
the amount of the capital tax. First, the numerator  of equation  (12) is decreasing  in the
amount  of the labor tax  since  these  labor  endowments  determine  the after-tax  labor income
directly,  and  indirectly  influence  capital  income. Additionally  the quantity  xr,,*1  in equation
(13)isa|sodecreasingintheamountofthelabortax,sinceahigherlabortaxlowersthe
amount of capital that these  agents  can afford to purchase  for the remaining  period'
But there are also two forces  influencing  welfare  to be decreasing  in the amount of the
capitaltax.First,obviouslythedenominatorofequation(12)isincreasingintheamount
of the capital tax.  Secondly,  the denominator of  the term in  equation (13) is also
decreasingintheamountofthecapitaltax'Thiscanbeseenbynotingfirstofallthatthe
members  of generation  (t-1) can  purchase  more  capital  in the second  period of life if more
of the capital tax is employed  in period  t.  This in turn raises  the level of x3,r+1,  but this in
turn must lower the value of xr,*, (since  X2,r+r  *  x:,r+r  =  1 (from equation (4))'  Hence
1,4
[(r  -  'f  )'",[(r  -  'l)',,,  *  a,]  . (r  -  'f  )',.,1.
[  ' -,,,1-!.-)t  -  it  ]
,l
lraising the level of l,  will increase  the value of the denominator  in equation (13), hence
raising  the value of the whole right side  of this equation. The effect  of a change  in l,  on
the denominators  of both equations  (12) and (13) makes  these  equations  itrqease  an
increasing  rate,  and this is the feature  that accounts  for the convexity  of the value function
observed  in Figure 5.11
Also, as Figure 5 illustrates,  there are positive  levels  of capital and labor taxation that
appeaf to minimize the value function (11). At these  tax rates  the agents  welfale is low
because  the taxes  are chosen  to both reduce  the (utility) value of wealth in the second
period of life, and also  reduce  the total return to holding capital.
Figure 6 illustrates the transition dynamics  for capitat holdings in  this example.  The
horizontal axis  measures  the quantity  of capital held by the middle-aged  in period t (x.,),
while the horizontal axis measures  the same  variable in  the following period.r2  The
upward-sloping  dashed  line in the figure is a 45 degree  line which helps pinpoint the
stationary  equilibria. The downward-sloping  line with a break  is the line that describes  the
transitional dynamics  of asset  holdings. As can be seen  in the diagram,  there are many
equilibria, depending  on what the initial asset  holdings  are. However,  there appear  to be
only two limiting equitibria. One has  a constant  steady-state  for capital holdings  equal  to
.4129. T\e  second  equilibria is the one  which displays  limiting cycles. In any period, for
any capital holdings (xr,) less  than .393  the middle-aged  agents  will choose  to use only
capital taxation to finance government  spending. Alternatively, for a capital holdings
greater  than .393  the rniddle-aged  agents  will choose  only  labor taxation. That is' the upper
branch of this line (to the left of this diagram) reflects  the amount of capital held by
middle-aged  agents  when the capital  tax is imposed,  while the lower branch describes  the
amount of capital held when the labor tax is enacted. For capital holdings  just equal to
.393,  the agent  will be indifferent between  the two types  of taxation.r3
There is an interesting  dynamic  behavior  in this example,  Ifthe  initial middle-aged  agents
hold a capital stock less than .393,  or greatef than .450,  then the economy  ultimatelyconvefges  to the cyclical  equilibrium. on  the other hand,  if the initial middle-aged  agents
have  capital  holdings  between  .393  and  ,450,  then the economy  ultimately  converges  to the
non-cyclic  equilibrium.ra  Hence  both the cyclic  and non-cyclic  equilibria are locally stable'
If by chance,  the solid  line describing  the transition  dynamics  for capital holdings  does  not
cross  the 45 degree  line, then there  is no steady-state  equilibria  without limiting cycles' It
will be shown  below that indeed  this can be the case'
Despite the fact that there is an equilibrium in which all endogenous  variables  display
cycles,  this equilibrium is  indeed  stationary,  since  the  variables  do not depend  on time, once
the capital  holdings  at the beginning  of the period  are  known. Also, in contrast  with other
,models,which  produce  limiting cycles,  the present  framework  does  not employ  a backward-
bending  supply  curve  for saving,  as  a function  of the interest  rate,  and  neither does  it make
use of any externality,  except  to the extent  that the voting scheme  can be interpreted as
one.
Lastly,  it is of interest  to compare  the welfare  implications  of the two different equilibria
in this particular example. In the non-cyclic  equilibrium the realized  utility level of all
agents  is 9.2929. ln the cyclic  equilibrium, the utility level of agents  who have relatively
plenty of capital  when middle-aged,  and  hence  vote for a labor tax in the second  period of
life, is 9.4537,  while the utility  level of agents  who relatively little  capital is 9'1551'
obviously, in the cyclic  equilibrium, for capital-rich  agents,  the benefits  of owning plenty
of capital and voting to tax labor when middle-aged  outweigh  the resulting  costs  imposed
by taxing  capital when middle-aged  and having  capital raxed  in the following period.rs
Fjxample  #2:  The point of this example  is to illustrate the instability exhibited by the
model in reaction to an expected  exogenous  shock  to the productivity of young agents.
Again there exists  two equilibria  for this  economy,  and  if the exogenous  shock  is sufficiently
largetheeconomywi|lmovefromt}restationaryequilibriumtothenon-stationaryone'
76The parameter  values  are chosen  as follows:  wr,ro=  13'75'  and otherwise  wt''= 11' w't=7'
d,=8,:5,8=3Vt,andx.t='4'Thatis,theeconomyhasnoexogenousdisturbancesuntil
period 10  when the young agents  are then femporarily  relatively  very Productive'
FigureTshowstheresultingbehaviorforthecapitalholdingsofthemiddle-agedagents.
Starting from  xrr=.{fl,  the capital holdings appear to  be converging to  a  constant'
However,theexogenousdisturbanceissufficientlylargethatfromperiodl0onward,the
economy  is on a cyclical  equilibrium  with every  second  generation  holding relatively  large





the agents  choose  to altefnate  these  taxes,  choosing  the capital  tax  only in even  periods  and
the labor tax in odd Periods.
It should  be noted that the exogenous  shock  in this example  has  been "large enough"  to
causetheeconomytot.akeapathontothecyclicalequilibrium.Forsmallerdisturbances
the economy  might only grivitate back  to the non-cyclic  equilibrium aftet sevetal  periods'
Example  #3:  This example  further illustrates  the nature  of the instability  exhibited  by the
model in reaction to an expected  exogenous  shock  to the productivity of young agents'
Thisexampleisidenticaltothepreviousonewiththeexceptionthatthediscountfactoris
lower. Again, there  will exist  two equilibria  for this economy,  but the exogenous  shock  will
notmaketheeconomygotothenon-stationaryequilibriumbecauseofthelowerdiscount
factor.
The parameter  values  are chosen  as follows:  wr,ro:13'75'  and otherwise  wt't=11' w't:7'
d.:g,-5,F=2'7vt'andx,,,=.4.Thatis,againtheeconomyhasnoexogenousdisturbances
17until period 10  when the young  agents  are then  temporartIy  relatively  productive'
Figure 10  shows  that capital  holdings  by middle  aged  agents  convelge  to a steady-state  until
period 10. At this time these  capital  holdings  are  temporarily  pushed  away  from this value,
but eventually  converge  back to this same  equilibrium. Figure 11  shows  the path for the
price of capital. It too is temporarily  displaced  from its steady-state  value, but converges
back to it steady  state  value.
To obtain an  understanding  of how  changing  the discount  factor  influences  the equilibrium
it may be useful  to look at Figure 12,  where  the transitional  dynamics  for asset  holdings  is
illustrated  for different discount  factors. Increasing  (decreasing)  the discount  factor moves
this,function  toward (away  from) the origin, As can  be seen,  for the case  in which 0=15'
there does  not even  exist  a non-cyclic  equilibrium since  the transitional  dynamics  line does
not cross  the 45 degree  line.
It should  be stated  that not all configurations  of this economy  exhibit the cycles  displayed
in these  examples.  To produce  these  cycles  requires  the right kind of balance  between  the
ratio of capital to labor income on the one hand, and the discount factor on the other
hand. In particular,  for a given  discount  factor (p), if the agent's.  labor income  is too high'
relative  to the amount  of capital  income,  then  agents  may  always  prefer  to have  labor taxed.
Conversely,  holding the discount factor constant,  if there is very little aggregate  Iabor
income, then agents may then ahvays  prefer capital taxation.  Alternatively, holding
constant  the levels of endowments  and dividends,  the agent is more likely to prefer the
capital (labor) tax, the lower (higher) is the discount factor since this makes future
consumption  less  (more) important. It should  be  noted,  however,  that experimentation  has
revealed that  although not  all  economies  exhibit these fluctuations, neither are the
economies  that do exhibit this behavior  "knife-edge,"  or extremely  special  cases. A wide
range of economies  can be seen  to display  these  features' For example,  Figure 12 shows
that when F:15  there is only a cyclical stationary equilibrium, and this equilibrium
continues  to appear  fot even  much higher levels  of p.
18It  is also easy  to incorporate an endogenous  labor decision  the agents  second  period.
However,  in some  cases  this effect  only serves  to exacerbate  the effects  described  above.l7
This is because  a fall in the agent's  wage  will then encourage  them to work less,  which will
then lower their wage  income  even  further.
It  should also be noted that examples  can also be constructed  in which a temporarily
unusually  high or low level of government  consumption  is also  capable  of generating  these
types  of cycles  as  well.
Example  #4:  A natural question  that arises  at this point is whether the taxes  are indeed
playing  much of a role in this economy. After all, in economies  of this solt, when agents
live for more than two periods,  fluctuations  in the  wealth  distribution  of this sort  are known
to arise  even  in he absence  of government  (see  Hufftnan (1987)).  Therefore,  itmaybe  that
the taxes  are sort of a side-show  which contribute  very little.  The present  examPle  shows
that this is not true.  This example  illustrates  the instability exhibited by the model in
Example  #2 depends  critically on the presence  of endogenous  taxation.
The parameter  values  that are chosen  are exactly  the same  as  in Example  #2: wr.to:L3.75,
and  otherwise  wr,,:11,  wr,,=?,  d,=g,=5,  B=3 v t, and  xrr=.4. Again,  the economy  has  no
exogenous  disturbances  until  period L0 when the young agents are then temporarily
relatively unproductive.  However, it  is of  interest to  compale the behavior of  the
equilibriurn  in this example  with that which  would arise  if there  were  a constant  tax regime
in place. In particular,  in the constant  tax  regime,  the economy  utilizes  only the labor tax
in every period  (rt  r=.2778),  and never  taxes  the return to capitat (to,:0).tt
Figure 13 shows  the resulting paths for the capital holdings of the middle-aged. The
dashed  line in this diagram is the same  as ttrat shown in Figure 7, with the economy
exhibiting  a cyclic  equilibrium after period 10. The solid line displays  the capital holdings
of the exact  same  economy,  but where  tax rates  are kept constant  for all time. There is no
cyclical  equilibrium for tlris latter economy.to  This example  shows  that the endogenous
19determination  of tax  rates  is be of critical  importance  in producing  the cyclical  equilibrium'
Example  #5:  This example  is presented  to show  how the transition dynamics  for capital
holdings is affected  by the composition  of aggregate  output into its components  of labor
and capital income. Consider  two alternative  economies,  one  which is identical to that in
the first examp|e  with w1,l=11,  wa.=7, d.=8.=5, and  p=3.  The second  is identical except
that wr,,=9. Figure 14  shows  how the transitional  dynamics  for capital  holdings  behaves  in
the two cases. Loosely speaking,  lowering the agent's  labor income has the effect of
making  capital  income  relatively  less  important  tlan it would otherwise  be. Consequently,
agents  are less  likely to want to choose  the labor tax,  and  more likely to choose  the capital
tax.  In  Figure 14, the break in the line describing  the transitional dynamics  of asset
holdings  is moved to tle  right when the amount of steady-state  labor income diminishes.
Because  of this the non-cyclic  equilibria  exists  in both of these  cases,  but when  wlr=l1  this
equilibrium has only labor income  being taxed. In the equilibrium in which wr,,=9, t}le
equilibrium has  only capital b€ing  taxed.
Example #6:  This example  is presented  to show  how the transition dynamics  for capital
holdings is affected by the level of government  spending.  Consider two alternative
economies,  one  which is identical  to that in the first example  with wr,,:11, wr,:7,  d,=g'=5,
and B:3.  The second  is identical except  that gr =  10. clearly, in this new case  the tax
rates must be higher to finance the government  consumPtion. The lines in Figure 15
describing  transitional  dynamics  displays  a larger  "break"  in this case  since  the taxes,  when
imposed,  have a much larger impact on the future capital holdings since the taxes  are
higher.  If  government  consumption  were zero, then there would be no break in  the
transitional  dynamics  line at all since  all taxes  would be zero. In the case  when g, :  19,
there is no non-cyclic  equilibrium, and there can only exist  equilibria in which there are
fluctuations. of  course,  in general  (but not always),  the lower is the level of government
spending,  the more likely it will be that there  will exist  a stationary  equilibria.
20w. FURTHER REMARKS
Barro  (1979) pfesents some normative reasons why,  in  a  dynamic environment,
governments  should "smooth"  the tax tates so as to minimize the burden of taxes. The
present  positive analysis  illustrates  why atomistic  agents,  behaving  in a privately optimal
manner. would choose to  have a  tax structure which would appeal to  cause some
fluctuations in  endogenous  variables.  In particular, this analysis  points to where the
potential divergences  might arise  among  positive  and normative  tax analyses'  The pullic
finance  literature is replete  with research  showing  the ways  in which observed  tax  lates may
differ  from  the  "optimal" tax policies, for  reasons  that are usually left  unexplained.
Nevertheless,  presumably  an arguable  view is that society  has arrived at its current tax
.policies  by agents  making  optimal  choices  when  choosing  political representatives  who will
make policy choices  for that will affect  society. It is also  our task to understand  how and
why these  choices  are made.
As  with  any analysis,  the present paper leaves many questions unanswered'  Here
assumptions  were  placed  on how  policy  variables  were  determined,  namely  thlough majority
voting rather than some  other, possibly  ad-hoc,  mechanism. It was  exogenously  imposed
that government  revenue  is derived  from the taxation  of labor  or (gross)  capital  income'
It would be better if it could be shown  that such  a policy mechanism  is "optimal" relative
to a set of potential mechanisms.  This remains  a formidable  topic for future research.
The present  model has  a fixed capital stock. It would be enlightening  to know how this
rype of majority voting scheme  would influence  the level of endogenous  investment  and
output. Presumably  higher  capital  tax  rates  would  deter  capital  accumulation,  and  influence
the wealth distribution  in the firture.4 Huffman (1993)  has  already  studied  this issue,  and
most  ofthe results  shown  above  still obtain  when  capital  accumulation  is incorporated. In
particular,  tlle agents  still choose  tax rates  of the "bang-bang"  variety. It is also  possible  to
show  that if agents  are permitted  to vote on the size  of the inflation tax in any period in
order to finance government  spending,  then they might choose  a volatile path for the
2linflation, as this is just anothef tax.  These analyses  are currently topics of  ongoing
research,
Additionally, it is also  of interest  to know how the results  presented  above  would change
if a different utility function were employed. Prelirninary  work in this area  indicates  that
the existing  dynamics  still are present  with other utility functions,  but that other dynamics
are  also  present.  By changing  the elasticity  of substitution  of consumption  between  periods,
it appears  that the slope  of the line describing  the transition dynamics  of asset  holdings
(e.g.  Figure 6) can  be made  steeper  or flatter. In particular,  if this line is made  sufficiently
steep  then the non-cyclic  steady-state  equilibrium can  be made unstable'
Additionally, on a topic that is closely  related, research  is also being conducted  into
whether  it is possible  to produce  sunspot  equilibria,  or more complex  cyclical  dynamics  for
this economy  by changing  the preferences.  That is to say,  what is being  studied  is how the
behavior of the transition dynamics  of the type shown  in Figure 6 an be altered so that
different cyclical  equilibria can arise.
It is possible  that this approach  could also  be utilized to explain  why government  spending
would be increased  at some times and not others.  Rather than just saying that this
spending  is wasteful,  instead  ihis might be undertaken  due to the fact that there would be
a significantly  large  constituency  that benefits  from such  spending.  Additionally, it may  be
possible  to use a similar model to explain  the level of the deficit that the government  may
run.  Possibly  the aforementioned  instability of the economy  could cause  government
spending  to display  an unstable  response  to a temporary  disturbance  to the economy'
The  forgoing analysis  raises obvious questions  concerning the manner in  which our
economic  poliry-making institutions  are designed. Do we choose  to have institutions in
which citizens  can  potentially  exert  unremitting  or day-to-day  control of governrnent  policy
based  on their own private self interests? or,  on the other hand, do we choose  to have
institutions  which set out policy according  to some  relatively  fixed rules that cannot beeasily  changed  based  on the whimsy  or vocal  protests  of groups  of citizens?2r  Should  we
choose  to have constitutional  amendments  prohibiting certain types  of taxation,  as there
effectively  is now in the U.S. with the poll tax, or at least Put some  restrictions  on the
amount  of this taxation? Some  countries,  such  as  Britain, have  no written constitution  and
therefore appear  to put few prior restrictions  on how such  policies  can be formulated.
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24FOOTNOTES
1. On the normative  side,  Lucas  (1990)  describes  why the desired  tax  on capital  should  be
zero, In a positive  and normative  analysis,  Barro (1979)  shows  why the government  may
wish to  "smooth" the levels of  distortional taxation over time so as to minimize the
deadweight  loss  from the taxation.
2.  Much of this existing  literature contains  analyses  of models  which are finite horizon
economies. The model studied  in the present  paper has  an infinite horizon, and as such
permits  an analysis  of how the endogenous  variables  evolve  over  time in reaction  to various
disturbances.  Alesina and Spear (1988) use the overlapping generations  model to
construct  a model of electoral  competition. Boldrin (1993)  uses  a tlree-period overlapping
generations  framework to analyze  the impact that public school financing has on the
accumulation  has  on human  capital.
As noted  by Alesina (1988),  much of the extant  literature  is rather descriptive,  and  not cast
within the context  of a general  equilibriurn  optimizing  flamework. The present  paper  does,
however,  feill  into tlris category.
3.  Uncertainty could obviously  be incorporated,  but this feature  is not of any importance
for the central issues  under study,  and would only obscure  the very simple nature of the
dynamics  that arises  in the perfect-foresight  version  of the economy'
4. Permitting  the agent  to have  different  labor  income  in the different  periods,  wr,,  *  wr,,*r,
or enabling  young  and  middle-agent  agents  to earn  different  amounts  in a given  period,  wlr
+ w",, enables  the model to have  the flavor of investment  in human capital which might
explain  why agent's  labor earnings  would differ in this manner. It would also  be possible
to incorporate  an endogenous  labor decision  in the agent's  second  period, but this would
add little while complicating  the present  setup.
5.  It could alternatively  be assumed  that just the dividend  was  taxable  but this would not
alter the central qualitative nature of the results,  although it would change  some of the
quantitative  results  presented  in tle  next section.
6. Agents  also  take into account  how  the taxes  imposed  in the present  period  will influence
Iuture asset  holdings  of the next generation,  (since  this is just one minus the amount the
current middle-aged  generation  will choose  to hold) and hence  how these  asset  holdings
will affect the future price of capital.
7.  lt  may be that there would be other equilibria as well with more complex forms of
strategic  interaction,  but the present  approach  would seem  to preserve  a sufficient  degree
of simplicity  and tractability,  given  the complexity  of the dynamics  in this infinite horizon
economy.
25g.  That is, this is meant to be an intratemporal  argument: tax rates in a given period
should be set so as to minimize this tax burden.  However,  as argued  by Barro (1979)'
obviously  the same  argument has been used to conclude  that taxes  should also be set
intertemporally  to minimize this burden as  well.
9.  In particular, this example  illustrates  the first two lines of the value function shown  in
equation (11), so this is the actual  value function uP to a constant.
10. The intuitive reason  behind why there exists  this nonlinear  relationship  is that there
appeam  to be a strange  hidden type  of double  taxation  in the model. consider a middle-
agiO  agent  who is conlemplating  voting  to tax  only  capital  to finance  government  spending.
fi"  tft"--o  contemplates  whit *ould  happen  if he voted  to tax  capital slightly  less,-and  taxed
labor a little bit more heavily. This would leave  him with somewhat  more of his capital
income,  but less  of his labor incom". If capital  income  remained  the same  the agent  could
merely then determine  if the changed  taxes  left hirn better off or not'  However,  capital
income  does  change  because  equation  (8) shows  that the price of capital  may fall because
of the higher  laboi taxes. Consiquently'tfre  middle-aged  agent  can_make  himselfrrorse  off
,"by  {axing:.1n6or  a little bit because  it lowers  his before  tax capital income as  well'
11. Central to tlris discussion  is how the price of capital  changes  as  the tax rates  change.
One might then be tempted  to observe  that this affect  would not be present  if there were
capital  iccumulation. This is not true. What is important here  is that the price of capital
is endogenous,  which  can  happen  in a model  with capital  accumulation,  not that the capital
stock  be fixed.
12. Of course  both axis  should  extend  from zero  to one,  but this has  not been done since
in this exarnple  the outer  tegions are never  realized.
13.  In this instance,  the agent  will be indifferent and hence  may then choose  a mixed
strate5, between  complete  labor taxation,  and complete  capital taxation.- However, it is
only tl-e initial middle-aged  agents  who might  choose  a mixed  strategy.  It is  clear from the
diagram  that no subsequ-ent  g6neration  would  tlren  have  a capital  stock  equal  to .393  in the
second  period  of their  life.
14. This example  is somewhat  special  since  the critical  value  of x.,=.393 that separates  tbe
cyclic  and non-cyclic  equilibria is also  the point where  the transition  line "breaks". This is
not always  the case. As is shown  in Figure 12 and 15,  there can occur a break in the
transition line, but with no non-cyclic  equilibrium'
15. Perhaps  surprisingly,  it turns out that the steady-state  welfare of agents  in these  two
equilibria ir such  that itt"  agents  are  better off in the cyclic  equilibria-..-  The reason  for this
isis follows. Relative  to the non-cyclic  equilibrium,  in the cyclic  equilibrium in the periods
when capital (labor) rax  is imposed,  the agents  are  consuming  less  (more).in both periods.
Howevei, the'cyclic equilibrium app"uts  to display  "smoother"  consumption  paths  within
u g"rr"ruiion, blt  obviously  nor aciott  generations.  This is perhaps  not as surprising  as it
26may at first seem  since  this only considers  the steady-state  welfare,  and ignores  the affect
onih"  ioitial generations,  and additionally  ignores  transitions  to the steady-state.
16. Keep in mind that what is being  shown  in Figure 7 is x1,*1,  which is chosen  in period
t.  This is why the "jump" in asset  h-oldings  in the diagram  appeals  to occul in period L1'
but in fact this occurs  in period L0.
17. This would depend  on the relative  strengths  of the wealth and  substitution  effects. If
the latter dominated  the former then the economy  is likely to disptay  the features  described
above  since  a labor tax  would then reduce  the  work effort and  further reduce  labor income'
18.  That is, these  are the steady  state  values  of the tax rates that the endogenous-tax
economy  is converging  to before  period 10. However,  this convergence  takes  place  for aay
constant  tax rates.
19. However,  for the constant  tax  case,  the higher  is the value  for B, the larger  will be the
fluctuations  that are displayed  in reaction  to an exogenous  disturbance'
20. Hence, this majority voting scheme  may  be another  pfopagation_mechanism  whereby
temporary technolory dirtotbin"".  would influence  futule levels of output, although it
,**-r  unlik"ly  thai'these could be used to explain the high-frequency  business  cycle
movements  in aggregate  time-series.
2i..  This has  everything  to do with how  central  banks  are  structured  in different economies'
some countries,  snch  is the Germany  choose  to have  relatively  independent  central  banks
who are supposed  to focus  primarily on producing  price stability. other.countries choose
to  have ceniral banks thai are much less independent  of the executive  or  legislative
branches  of government,  and are more susceptible  to political pressure'
This is also felated to how government  institutions  at different levels  are designed. For
example,  what policy  forces  should  be vested  in the Federal  Government  of a country,  and
which powers  shouto  ue possessed  by the local governments?  And how are these  powers

































































10 20  30  40  50  60  70  80

















01r--  ,  I  ,  |  ,  I -'0.3 
0.32  0.34  0.36  0.38  0.4  0.42  0.44  0.46  0.48  0.5



















,=  't1  (


































































0.48 0.46 0.38  0.4  0.42  0.44






























0.46  0.48 0.34  0.36
n?1. "'t.: 0.38  0.4  0.42  0.44
Capital  Holdings  Xz,r
Figure  14










.J u.)L 0.46 0.48 0.38  0.4  0.42  0.44
Capital  Holdings  Xz,,
Figure  15
B-JRESEARCH PAPERS  OF THE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT
FEDERALRESERVE BANK OF DALI-AS
Available,  at no charge,  from tle  Research  Department
Federal  Reserve  Bark of Dallas.  P.O.  Box 655906
Dallas,  Texas 75265-5gM
9201  Are Deep  Recessions  Followed  by Strong  Recoveries?  (Mark A. Wynne  and
Nathan  S.  Balke)
97-V2 The Case  of the "Missing  M2" (Jobn  V. Duca)
9203  Immigrant  Linlc to the Home Country: Implicatiors for Trade,  WeHare  and
Factor  Rewards  (David M. Gould)
9204  Does  Aggregate  Output Have a Unit Root? (Mark A. Wynne)
9205  rnflation and Its Variabitity: A Note (Kenneth  M. Emery)
9206  Budget  Constrained  Frontier Measures  of Fiscal  Equality and Effrciency  in
Schooling  (Shawna  Grosskopf,  Kathy Hayes,  Iori  Taylor, William Weber)
f207  T\e Effects  of Ctedit Availability, Nonbail  Competitioq and  Tax Reform on
Bank Consumer  Irnding  (John  V. Duca and Bonnie  Garrett)
90{t  On tle  Future Erosion  of the North Anerican Free Trade Agreement  (William
C. Gruben)
9209  Threshold  Cointegration  (Nathan  S. Balke and Thomas  B' Fomby)
9210  Cointegration  and  Tests  of a Classical  Model of Inflation in Argentin4 Bolivia"
Brazil, Mexico,  and Peru (Raril Anibal Feliz and  John  H. Welch)
9211  Nominal Feedback  Rules  for Monetary  Policy:  Some  Comments  (Evan  F.
Koenig)
9212  Tt,e Analysis  of Fiscal  Policy  in Neoclassical  Models' (Mark Wynne)
9273  Measuring  the Value of School  Quality (I-ori Taylor)
9214  Forecasting  Turning Points:  Is a Two-State  Characterization  of the Business
C.lcle  Appropriate?  (Kenneth  M. Emery  & Evan  F. Koenig)
9275  Energ  Security:  A Comparison  of hotectionist Policies  (Mine I(  Yiicel and
Carol Dahl)y2L6  An Analysis  of the Impact of Two Fiscal  Policies  on the Behavior  of a
Dynamic  Asset  Market (Gregory  W. Huffman)
9301  Human Capital  Externalities,  Trade,  and  Economic  Growth
(David Gould and  Roy J. Rutrin)
9302  TheNew Face  df Latin'Arhei{cal Finandial  Flows,  Markets, add InStitutions  in the
1990s  (John  Welch)
9303  A General  Two Sector  Model of Endogenous  Growth with Human and
Physical  Capital (Eric Bond,  Ping  Wang,  and Chong  IL Yip)
9304  The Politicat Economy  of School  Reform (S. Grosskopf,  IC llayes, L  Taylor,
and W  Weber)
9305  Money,  Output, and  Income  Velocity (Theodore  Palivos  and Ping Wang)
9306  Constructing  an Altemative Measure  of Changes  in Reserve  Requirement
Ratios (Joseph  H. Haslag  and Scott  E. Hein)
9307  Money  Demand  and Relative  Prices  During Episodes  of Hlperinllation
(Ellis W. Tallman and Ping  Wang)
9308  On Quantity  Theory  Restrictions  and the Signa[ing  Value of the Money
Multiplier (Joseph  Haslag)
9309  The Algebra of Price Stability  (Nathan  S. Balke and Kenneth  M. Emery)
9310  Does  It Matter How Monetary  Policy  is Implemented? (Joseph  H. Haslag  and
Scott  E. Hein)
9311  Real Effects  of Money  and  Welfare Costs  of Inflation in an Endogenously
Growing  Economy  with Transactions  Costs  (Ping  Wang  and Chong  IC Yip)
9312  Borrowing  Constraints,  Household  Debt, and  Racial Discrimination  in Loan
Markets  (John  V. Duca and Stuart  Rosenthal)
9313  Default Rislq Do[arization, and Currency  Substitution  in Mexico
(William Gruben  and  John  Welch)
9314  Technological  Unemployment  (W. Michael Cox)
9315  Output, Tnfl61is4  and Stabilization  in a Small  Open  Economy:  Evidence  From
Mexico (John  H. Rogers  and  Ping Wang)9316  Price Stabilization,  Output Stabilization  and Coordinated  Monetary  Policy  Actions
(Joseph  H. Haslag)
9317 An Alternative Neo-Classical  Growth Model with Closed-Form  Decision  Rules
(Gregory  W. Huffman)
9318  Why the Composite  Index of I-eading  Indicators  Doesn't  I*ad
(Evan  F.-Koenig  and  Kenneth  M; Emery)
9319  Allocative Inefficiency  and  Local Government:  Evidence  Rejecting  the Tiebout
Hypothesis  (Irri  L  Taylor)
9320  The Output Effects  of Govemment  Consumption:  A Note (Mark A  Wynne)
9321  Should  Bond Funds  be Included  in M2? (John  V. Duca)
9322  Recessions  and Recoveries  in Real Business  C.lcle  Models:  Do Real Business
"C}cle Models  Generate  Cyclical  Behavior?  (Mark d  Wynne)
9323' Retatiation,  Liberalization,  and Trade Wars:  The Political Economy  of
Nonstrategic  Trade Policy  (David M. Gould and Graeme  L  Woodbridge)
9324 A General  Two-Sector  Model of Endogenous  Growth  with Human and Physical
Capitat Balanced  Growth and  Transitional  Dynamia (Eric W. Bond"  Ping  Wang
and Chong  K  Yip)
9325  Growth and Equity with Endogenous  Human  Capital Taiwan's  Economic  Miracle
Revisited  (Maw-Lin I*e,  Ben-Chieh  Liu, and Ping  Wang)
9326  Clearnghouse  Banks  and Banknote  Over-issue  (Scott  Freeman)
9327  CoaL  Natural Gas  and Oil Markets  after World War II:  What's  Ol4 What's
New?  (Mine K  Yiicel and Shenryi  Guo)
9328  On the Optimality of Interest-Bearing  Reserves  in Economies  of Overlapping
Generations  (Scott  Freeman  and  Joseph  Haslag)
9329' Retaliation,  Liberalization,  and Trade Wars:  The Political Economy  of
Nonstrategic  Trade Policy  (David M. Gould and Graeme  L  Woodbridge)
Reprint of 9323
9330  On the Existence  of Nonoptimal  Equilibria in Dynamic  Stochastic  Economies
(Jeremy  Greenwood  and Gregory  W. Huftnan)
9331  The Credibility and  Performance  of Unilateral Target  Zones:  A Comparison  of
the Mexican  and Chilean  Cases  (Raul A  Feliz and John  H' Welch)9332  Endogenous  Growth and Intertrational  Trade (Roy J. Ruftrn)
9333  Wealth Effects,  Heterogeneity  and Dynamic  Fiscal  Policy  (Zsolt Becsi)
9334  The Inefficiency  of Seigniorage  from Required  Reserves  (Scott  Freeman)
9335  Problems  of Testing  Fiscal  Solvency  in High Inflation Economies:  Evidence
from Argentin4-Brazil, and Mexico-(Joh H; Welch)
9336  Income  Ta:res  as Reciprocal  Tadffs (W. Michael Co4 David M. Gould, and Roy
J. Ruffrn)
9337  Assessing  tle  Economic  Cost  of Unilateral Oil Conservation  (Stephen  P.A. Brown
and Hillard G. Huntington)
9338  Exchange  Rate Uncertainty  and Economic  Growh in Latin America (Darryl
Mckod  and  John  H. Welch)
9339  Searching  for a Stable  M2-Demand  Equation  (Evan  F. Koenig)
9340 A Survey  of Measurement  Biases  in Price Indexes  (Mark A  Wynne  and Fiona
Sigalla)
9341  Are Net Discount  Rates  Stationary?:  Some  Furtler Evidence  (Joseph  H. Haslag'
Michael Nieswiadomy,  and  D. J. Slottje)
9342  On the Fluctuations  Induced  by Majority Voting (Gregory  W. Huffuan)